The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 47
Number 1 Parameters Spring 2017

Article 8

Spring 3-1-2017

Immunity in Contingency Operations: A Proposal for US
Contractors
Ellen "Elle" Klein

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ellen ". Klein, "Immunity in Contingency Operations: A Proposal for US Contractors," Parameters 47, no. 1
(2017), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2837.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

AFTER 15 YEARS OF CONFLICT

Immunity in Contingency Operations:
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ABSTRACT: This article introduces the nuances of bilateral
security agreements and status of force agreements in Afghanistan.
Many contain legal restrictions that complicate the ability of
Long War contractors to provide advice and security during
international missions.

D

epartment of Defense (DoD) contract employees have become
a vital part of the force. Soon after Overseas Contingency
Operations began in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report observed “limits
on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called ‘force
caps,’ led DoD to use contractors to provide support to its deployed
forces.”1 Many of these contractors play a “critical role in supporting
US troops.”2 Most third-country and even US contract employees are
generally systems contractors who provide basic life and information
technology support; however, many US contractors provide direct and
indirect command support such as advising and security.3
According to the Congressional Research Service, 28,189 of 45,592
Defense Department contractors working for US Central Command in
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 were in Afghanistan and Iraq.4 Few
know more than 3,000 contractors were killed and another 1,000 were
wounded in these countries’ wars; American contractors account for
approximately 32 percent of these casualties.5 There were even periods
during these long wars in which more US contractors than US military
personnel were killed. In 2014, for example, “private contractors
accounted for 64 percent of all U.S. deaths in Afghanistan (56 service
members and 101 contractors died).”6 Given that contract personnel
represent approximately 72 percent, nearly two-thirds, of the DoD

1 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services
to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 8.
2 Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and
Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2017 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2017), 1.
3 Gordon L. Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to
Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them” (conference paper, Joint Services
Conference on Professional Ethics 2000, Springfield, VA, January 27–28, 2000).
4 Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Contractor and Troop Levels, 2.
5 “Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs: Defense Base Act Case Summary by
Employer,” US Department of Labor, March 31, 2017, https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc
/dbaallemployer.htm; “Contractor Casualty Statistics,” Feral Jundi, February 9, 2017,
http://feraljundi.com/contractor-casualty-statistics/; and Micah Zenko, “The New Unknown
Soldiers of Afghanistan and Iraq,” Foreign Policy, May 29, 2015, http://foreignpolicy
.com/2015/05/29/the-new-unknown-soldiers-of-afghanistan-and-iraq/.
6 Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”
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manpower in Afghanistan, clear legal protections for these Americans
while in theater would seem only reasonable.7
Under the US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
signed in 2014, US contactors working in Afghanistan became subject
to Afghan law. Since the agreement was fully implemented in January
2016, companies and individual workers must navigate complex and
onerous procedures that are often arbitrarily interpreted and inconsistently enforced. This quandary often leaves many American contract
personnel in untenable situations in which they may be subjected to
fines, deportation, or even arrest by Afghan authorities. Contractors
frequently face the dilemma of illicitly bribing Afghan officials or going
without documents required by the BSA and Afghan law. To compound
these problems, US government officials often view contractors with
suspicion and even contempt, and are reticent to defend the contractors’
cause with the Afghan government. These obstacles degrade the
contractors’ ability to support the mission for which they were hired
fully and efficiently.
Therefore, the American position regarding its contractors in
Afghanistan needs to be reevaluated. Specifically, the United States
should consider renegotiating the current BSA with Afghanistan and
any forthcoming status of forces agreements (SOFAs) for ongoing
operations to ensure legal protections for this group of Americans.
Despite the dangers and sacrifices, contractor employees often feel
marginalized and undervalued by both military and civilian government
personnel, who may think of them as greedy, corrupt, and operating
outside the law.8 This negative perception is not imaginary. Despite the
prevalence of contractors with previous military service, professional
competition between the military and the contractor communities
is fierce.9 Scholars claim to be alarmed by the level of integration of
contractors into military activities, and the bulk of the literature begins
by assuming contractor motives are less than noble.
The pejoratively titled Patriots for Profit, by Naval Post Graduate
School scholar Thomas C. Bruneau, for example, broadly challenges
stereotypes regarding civilian-military relations; nonetheless, he
identifies dependence on contractors as a strategic weakness.10 Another
scholar holds private contractor firms operate opaquely, carrying “the
stench of corruption” and eroding “trust in the motives behind [their]
efforts.”11 And some legal experts are even ready to cede US sovereignty
7 For more on the ratio of 28,626 contractors to 9,800 military personnel, see Micah
Zenko, “Mercenaries Are the Silent Majority of Obama’s Military” Foreign Policy, May 18, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-the-silent-majority-merenaries
-iraq-afghanistan/. For more on the estimated 750,000 private-sector contractors providing services
to the Defense Department, see Robert F. Hale, Business Reform in the Department of Defense: An Agenda
for the Next Administration (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2016), note 18.
8 For more on the common misuse of “mercenaries,” the similarities between them and private
military contractors, and the legal perspective, see J. Ryan Cutchin, Privately Contracted Military Firms
in the Twenty-First Century: Reclassifying, Redefining, and Reforming the Way We Fight (thesis, Naval Post
Graduate School, June 2012), 75–76. For more perspective on contractors’ sense of being marginalized, see Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”
9 Scott L. Efflandt, “Military Professionalism & Private Military Contractors,” Parameters 44,
no. 2 (Summer 2014): 53.
10 Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
11 Cutchin, Privately Contracted, 3.
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over American contractors as they look to international law for ways to
“mitigate concerns,” “control private military actors,” and “encourage
their compliance to [international] public norms.”12
While there may be empirical evidence that some contractors may
not be motivated to serve solely out of a sense of patriotic duty, these
American citizens nonetheless deserve legal protections and considerations afforded to other US civilians similarly serving overseas.13
Although contractors, specifically those performing security duties, may
have had too much latitude during the height of combat operations and
expeditionary capacity building in Iraq and Afghanistan (circa 2002–08),
the opposite is true today.

The Need for Status of Forces Agreements

On September 30, 2014, in one of his first official acts as the newly
inaugurated president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani agreed to the
BSA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of
Forces Agreement.14 These types of agreements are standard treaty-like
mechanisms that establish the rights and privileges of US personnel
present in a sovereign nation to support larger security arrangements.15
According to an International Security Advisory Board report, the
United States has similar agreements with more than 100 nations.16
Among other things, SOFAs set the conditions for protecting
US interests to ensure taxpayer dollars are properly managed and US
personnel are not subjected to foreign taxes, customs fees, and other
administrative liabilities in the course of carrying out the security
arrangement. According to DoD Directive 5525.1, Status of Forces
Policy and Information, the main goal of any SOFA is “to protect, to the
maximum extent possible, the rights of United States personnel who may be
subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign
prisons.”17 In general, SOFAs are negotiated with host nations to allow
the presence of US military forces and to ensure Defense Department
personnel—military members, government civilians, and sometimes
contractors—are given limited legal protections from host nation laws
12 Ibid., 89; and Laura A. Dickinson, “Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law,” William & Mary Law Review 47, no. 1
(2005): 135–237.
13 In addition to anecdotal evidence that most US contractors have previously served in the US
military, 61.5 percent of respondents in a study on military versus corporate culture were former
military. For more on this finding and the trend to outsource positions such as “security guards,
operational planners, and participants in raids by special operation forces . . . endanger[ing] the basic
tenets of the military profession itself,” see Gary Schaub Jr. and Volker Franke, “Contractors as
Military Professionals?,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 93, 94, 100–101.
14 On behalf of President Ghani, Afghan National Security Advisor Mohammed Haneef
Atmar cosigned the BSA with US Ambassador James B. Cunningham and the NATO SOFA with
NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems.
15 For more on the distinctions between various international agreements, which are led by
the Department of State, see Barry E. Carter et al., International Law (New York: Aspen Publishing,
2003), 203; and Frederic L. Kirgis, “International Agreements and U.S. Law,” ASIL Insights 2, no.
5. Notably, “the NATO SOFA is the only SOFA that was concluded as part of a treaty.” R. Chuck
Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2.
16 International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), Report on Status of Forces Agreements
(Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2015), 1.
17 US DoD, Status of Forces Policy and Information, Directive (DoDD) 5525.1 (Washington, DC:
DoD, 2003); emphasis added.
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and international tribunals. In other words, the SOFA establishes how
jurisdiction over US personnel is exercised in the host nation.18
Under US law, the Department of State is the lead agency for all
international agreements, even when an agreement, such as the BSA,
is focused on Department of Defense activities.19 These agreements,
when executed by the United States, usually contain a clause that each
party has an inherent right to self-defense, which allows either party to
cancel the agreement at any time. After September 11, 2001, the United
States encountered new and complex expeditionary and civil-society
development missions imbued with varying United Nations Security
Council authority, which created a new era of SOFA-craft, requiring
experts focused on writing and negotiating such agreements.20

The Afghanistan Agreements

After the initial NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the Military
Technical Agreement of January 2002 (MTA) was established under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001).
The agreement covered all forces under the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, including support personnel
working with the interim Afghan administration.21 The agreement did
not, however, apply to the non-NATO US forces covered under the
commonly referenced Diplomatic Note No. 202.22 While the MTA
specifically reserved jurisdiction for support personnel under the NATO
mission to an individual’s home country, the note covered support
personnel operating exclusively under the US mission, Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) (2001–14). Although the note did mention
support personnel, it left the level of protection for contractors and their
employees open to interpretation.
After 13 years, the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan formally
ended. On January 1, 2015, coalition and US forces simultaneously
began a new phase of involvement in Afghanistan: the NATO-led
mission, Resolute Support, to train, advise, and assist and the US ForcesAfghanistan (USFOR-A) mission; Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, to
contribute to the Resolute Support mission; and to US counterterrorism
missions. The new missions required new agreements, thus the NATO
SOFA and US-Afghanistan BSA were drafted and signed. Formal
implementation of these agreements, however, was not scheduled until
the following year, giving contractors until January 2016 to prepare for
compliance.
18 Mason, Status of Forces Agreement, 3.
19 See Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972) issued pursuant thereto by the Department
of State and codified at 22 C.F.R. 181 (2010) reflecting Department of State Circular 175 (1955), as
amended, codified at Volume 11, Chapter 700 of the Foreign Affairs Manual (Circular 175).
20 ISAB, Status of Forces Agreements, 15.
21 See ISAF Commander-Afghan Transitional Authority, Military Technical Agreement of
January 2002, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta
.pdf (accessed February 25, 2017); and Jeremy Greenstock to President of the United Nations
Security Council, S/2002/117, January 25, 2002, which references UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which reaffirms UNSCR 1378 (2001) and UNSCR 1383 (2001).
22 Karen DeYoung, “Only a Two-Page ‘Note’ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” Washington
Post, August 28, 2008; and Diplomatic Note No. 202, Agreement Regarding the Status of United States
Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and Exercises,
and Other Activities, State Department Number 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316 (Treaty), May 28, 2003.
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The development of specific implementation criteria is standard for
such agreements; for example, the 1966 agreement with South Korea,
amended in 2001, established a joint committee for consultation, and the
2002 Japan-United States Status of Forces Command Order established
a joint committee for “any matter regarding [the SOFA’s] implementation.” Likewise, an essential component of both the BSA and the SOFA
for Afghanistan was the requirement for implementation bodies to
resolve “any divergence in views or dispute regarding the interpretation
or application.” The BSA Joint Commission and the AfghanistanNATO Implementation Commission were established “to oversee
implementation” of the agreements and the auxiliary groups, which held
their first combined meeting on February 4, 2016.23 No further guidance
was provided; therefore, an additional document was required to lay
out the procedures for convening and conducting the business of the
commissions as well as establishing an Executive Steering Committee,
working groups, and a secretariat for each.
To date, the missions in Afghanistan have two separate agreements
and two distinct implementation bodies with identical leadership and
nearly identical members. The US contingent is, in fact, dual-hatted. As
the US member of the secretariat for the BSA, the author participated
in Joint Commission meetings at the same time and in the same room
as the NATO commission meetings; people addressed the same agenda
items and issues as members of both groups. The similarities and
concurrent meetings resulted in nearly identical minutes reflecting only
minor changes to indicate the two different bodies.
Melding these two implementation commissions may have been
expedient, but the arrangement inhibits addressing important issues
affecting only US contractors. The NATO SOFA focuses on nonkinetic
train, advise, and assist activities. The BSA is between the United States
and Afghanistan only and includes the counterterrorism mission which
may include more kinetic activities “when the U.S. deems it necessary.”24
This fundamental difference in mission alone warrants separation as
the more kinetic training usually requires contractors to be armed.
Moreover, issues regarding the proper and legal use of deadly force
by contract employees authorized to carry weapons while assisting
US military forces in dangerous missions will not be of interest to our
NATO partners.

The Immunity Question

A primary objective of the US and NATO missions is to assist the
Afghan government in becoming administratively functional and able
to properly exercise the powers of a sovereign nation, which includes
consular and immigration functions, taxing, business licenses, and
23 The similar bodies comply with Article 25 of the BSA and Article 23 of the “Agreement
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the
Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO-Led Activities
in Afghanistan” (NATO SOFA) signed by the RS Commander and the Afghan Minister of Defense
on November 6, 2015.
24 Note that BSA articles 4, 5, and 6 refer to an earlier agreement, The Strategic Partnership
Agreement, which went into effect on July 4, 2012, and defers concerns regarding security and
defense to the Defense and Security Cooperation Working Group, which did not meet for the first
time until April 2016, leaving the BSA for more mundane, operational issues, such as contractor
compliance.
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determining who is permitted to carry firearms. Therefore, as the new
Afghan government began to gain more autonomy, it seemed natural
for the United States and NATO to shift jurisdiction over contractors
to the Afghan government. This decision, however, exposed contract
employees, many of whom are US citizens, to a system rife with
corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude coupled with limited avenues
for redress.25
The US policy identifies techniques for crafting agreements to
ensure the maximum protection for all US citizens. Some SOFAs include
language that, according to the International Security Advisory Board
report, “will most always include special agreements and arrangements
for both civilian DoD employees and contractors” within the scope
of their official duty.26 The SOFAs for Japan and Korea, for instance,
cover US citizens who are contractor personnel,” especially when they
“qualify as technical experts” and are involved in assistance of “key
activities” that are “closely linked to a military mission.”27 Despite these
examples and the Defense Department’s stated policy of extending
protections to all US personnel, “less than 10 percent of SOFAs directly
address government contractors.”28 Unfortunately, the US-Afghanistan
BSA falls within the 90 percent that does not offer such protections
in a country of continued armed confl ict. The BSA specifically states:
“Afghanistan maintains the right to exercise jurisdiction over United
States contractors and United States contractor employees.”29 Such an
arrangement may be feasible in nations and regions which have a culture
of rule of law and transparency, but the reality in Afghanistan demands
revisiting this provision of the BSA.
While most contractors and contract employees finish tours of duty
without incident, many personnel find BSA compliance difficult and
understand the inherently dangerous consequences established therein—
for example, the BSA allows military personnel and Defense Department
civilians to enter and exit without passports, but contractors are required
to obtain passports and visas.30 Although most contractors purchase
multiple entry visas, the Afghan government insists contractors also
acquire an entry or exit stamp every time they enter or leave Afghanistan.
Stamping is a traditional practice at most borders. But, the Afghan
government did not have the capacity to provide such services on a
regular basis from 2015 to 2016. This deficiency affected contractors
who had been permitted in the country previously with no stamp in their
passport; they now had no way to exit Afghanistan. While they waited
for the Afghan government to obtain the capability to stamp visas,
25 For the US government’s most recent assessment on the issues of ministerial capacity building and endemic governmental corruption see, Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency
Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2016–December
31, 2016 (Washington, DC: US Office of the Inspector General, 2017), 4–5, 39–41, 48, 64–67.
26 ISAB, Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 20.
27 Donald P. Oulton and Alan F. Lehman, “Deployment of U.S. Military, Civilian and
Contractor Personnel to Potentially War Hazardouss Areas from a Legal Perspective,” DISAM
Journal of International Security Assistance Management 23, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 15–21, 16; and ISAB,
Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 52.
28 G. Christine Ballard and Wray E. Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties: Status of Forces and
USAID Agreements,” Journal of International Taxation 17, no. 4 (April 2006).
29 BSA, art. 13, para. 6.
30 BSA, art. 15, paras. 1, 2.
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contractors had to choose between traveling back to the United States or
mailing their passports for processing. Moreover, if an Afghan official
found a contractor’s passport had no stamp in it when the contractor
attempted to leave the country, there would be dire consequences—
unless the official was paid to ignore the lack of a stamp.31
In one incident, contractors spent months diligently pursuing entry
stamps in order to comply with the Afghan law, only to be told that the
stamps were not readily available. Without a separate US-focused implementation committee, there was nowhere to voice concerns formally or
to seek official assistance. When the Afghan Border Police finally did
start stamping visas, some contractors traveled days to and from the
designated ports of entry within Afghanistan to join others who were
literally lining up for the only opportunity to get their passports stamped.
There was little official information to enable efficient compliance. In
fact, despite the willingness of the US contractors to comply, at least one
group was issued a blunt statement through official US channels: report
for a stamp within 48 hours or face arrest, fines, or deportation.
As the January 1, 2016, deadline for contractor compliance with
the BSA approached, a significant number of contract employees were
unable to attain the required paperwork and permits, including those
for weapons, which put their safety at risk. In some cases, individual
employees had no one to blame but their own lack of urgency. But,
many cases of noncompliance were caused by external forces, including
political and legal pressures such as the well-documented bribery and
corruption endemic in Afghanistan.32 When contractors sought redress
with US officials, there was little institutional support for them due to
the lack of protections in the BSA.

Full Immunity Option

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces during war or
contingency operations.33 Today, American contractors in Afghanistan
are subject to US federal and military jurisdiction as well as Afghan law.
While the International Security Advisory Board report recommends
protections for contractors be written into agreements on a case-by-case
basis, it acknowledges there “will be instances where the United States
has a strong interest in protection for contractors.”34 Specifically, the
report mentions missions with “large scale deployments that entail a
very substantial and continuing U.S. presence,” environments where
“contractors are deeply integrated into core military operations and
mission tasks,” and tasks in which contractor involvement has a high
31 A number of contractors in Afghanistan expressed they had no choice but to pay Afghan
officials who demanded bribes even though the practice violated Afghan and US law, specifically the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
32 For more on Afghanistan’s ranking of 166 out of 168 countries ranked for corruption, see
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG Afghanistan.
33 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 552; and Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, para. a(10). See US Secretary
of Defense, “UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and
Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War
and in Contingency Operations” (memorandum, March 10, 2008).
34 ISAB, Report on Status of Forces Agreements, 51–52.
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“risk of incidents.”35 When negotiating such agreements, the report
suggests “contractor protection is worth insisting on.”36
One solution to the dilemma with contractors is renegotiating the
BSA to include full immunity for contractors supporting US military
and diplomatic missions. American and Afghan officials have reasons
to avoid this option, not the least of which is that it amounts to an
admission of the Afghan government’s failure to oversee contractors
competently. Nonetheless, the short-term pain of the United States
reasserting full jurisdiction over contractors may pay dividends in the
long-run for both countries, as the mission would be better equipped to
train, advise, and assist the Afghan government even with reductions in
military and diplomatic personnel.
Some skeptics claim immunity for contractors and their employees
will never again be politically viable as the result of Blackwater
contractors’ actions at Nisour Square in Baghdad (2007). The shootings
left 17 Iraqi civilians dead and 20 others injured.37 While the Coalition
Provisional Authority established immunity for all coalition personnel,
including contractors, the American government chose to prosecute
several members of Blackwater through the US court system.38 After this
incident, the United States felt compelled to reconsider the large aperture
of legal and political protection created for contract employees. In 2008,
the US government agreed to lift immunity for contractors in Iraq.39
Others argue the contractors’ case in Afghanistan not only suffers
from the bitter legacy of the Blackwater contractor’s actions but also
from President Hamid Karzai’s residual distrust from America’s first
attempt at an agreement.40 This personal animosity combined with
the shifting US policy against contractor immunity shaped the current
BSA so that it lacks much needed administrative and legal protections
for contract companies and employees. These insufficient protections
affect contractors’ daily lives, especially those who are required to carry
weapons in order to do their jobs. Such contractors must apply for an
endorsement from US Forces-Afghanistan to be armed and must acquire
weapons permits issued by the Afghan government.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 The question of the legitimacy of the actions of the Blackwater employees, despite the
eventual sentencing of several members of the security team, remains a subject for debate.
38 Coalition Provisional Authority, Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liason Missions, Their Personnel and
Contractors, Order Number 17, June 26, 2003. The UN Security Council-recognized legal receivership
was in authoritative control of Iraq at the time of the Nisour Square incident. Some pundits called
for the US government to waive the immunity clause granted in Order No. 17 and allow the contractors who committed serious crimes to be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. See Scott Horton, “Getting
Closer to the Truth about the Blackwater Incident,” Browsings (blog), Harpers, November 14, 2007.
39 During negotiations for the 2008–11 SOFA, some Iraqi politicians also wanted to remove
immunity for US service personnel, which the military opposed.
40 For more on the background and history of presidential directives from the Karzai administration concerning private security companies, see Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s
Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2009); Renata Giannini and Rens
de Graaff, “The Private Security Companies (PSCs) Dilemma in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Security
4, no. 10 (December 20, 2010); and Presidential Directive (PD) 62, which mandated that all private
security companies be disbanded by December 2014 and directed the development of a committee
to facilitate the actions necessary to “scrap” all such contractors. Under President Ashraf Ghani,
Presidential Directive 66 rescinded some of the prohibitions of PD 62 to relieve some of the pressures on security contractors, but the new status of contractors is still under debate.
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Moreover, while the BSA states members of the military and US
civilians can wear uniforms, bear arms without acquiring Afghan
weapons permits, and have unlimited entry and exit rights without
requiring visas, US contract employees cannot. Under Afghan
jurisdiction, if contractors do not have a valid visa, they can be detained
or deported; if they do not have proper weapons permits, they can be
arrested.41 These obstacles create moral and legal dilemmas for a number
of contractors and their employees. Some contractors can obtain relief
through administrative exceptions, but many cannot.
An additional concern for contractors involves accusations of owing
taxes to the Afghan government, which can create an administrative
logjam.42 For example, when a contracting company is on the Afghan
blacklist for failing to pay taxes—rightly or wrongly—their employees
can incur great personal risk. Without the proper tax documents,
American corporate contractors cannot acquire or renew their licenses
to operate their businesses in Afghanistan. Without those licenses, their
employees cannot obtain other documents needed to carry weapons
legally for self-protection.
Although most contractors worked in Afghanistan without the
need to carry a weapon, those who had weapons were left in precarious
positions.43 Either they could not participate in missions because they
would have left the secure military bases while carrying their weapons
illegally—without the proper Afghan permit—or worse, they would
go on missions with no weapon at all. This left US citizens who were
performing critical services for the military without proper force
protection in what was often a very dangerous environment. These
administrative catch-22s frustrated contractors and prevented them
from providing services. The situation also created headaches for the US
military and diplomatic personnel responsible for ensuring compliance
and strained the US mission.44

The Limited Immunity Option

Providing contractors full immunity from Afghan law, which is
currently granted to military personnel and federal civilians, would
alleviate such problems and allow missions to be conducted more
efficiently. But, amending the BSA for such privilege may be a bridge
41 By 2015–2016, there was little reason to think arrests would actually occur despite numerous
anecdotal cases and one reported detention. See Sayed Jawad, “Afghanistan Frees US Contractor
Illegally Detained in a Dispute,” Khaama Press, April 6, 2013.
42 For more on the thorny taxation issues in Afghanistan arising from “a lack of clarity” in the
MTA, see US Department of Defense Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs) Charles A.
Allen, “Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq—Assistance in Responding to Questions Regarding
Taxation under the Respective Status of Forces Agreements” (memorandum, March 29, 2011).
See also Paul Pompeo, Afghanistan Initiates Plans to Tax US Government Contractors (Washington, DC:
Arnold and Porter LLP, 2011); Ballard and Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties”; and Adam G. Province,
“Aggressive Foreign Tax Authorities and Military Agreements: Maintaining Tax Exemption in
SOFAs to Protect Civilian Contractors from Local-Country Tax,” Journal of International Taxation
27, no. 3 (March 2016).
43 Note that under international law, contractors are noncombatants who are generally not valid
military targets depending on their specific function. See Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield.”
44 Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 114th Cong.
(October 8, 2015) (statement of General John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute
Support and US Forces-Afghanistan); and Hearing on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Posture in Afghanistan:
Post-2014 Transition, Risks, and Lessons Learned, 114th Cong. (March 4, 2015) (statement of General
John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).
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too far. Thus, limited immunity might be a more realistic option to
ease the burden on contractors and better provide for their safety.
Under such a scheme, the US government would play a greater role in
facilitating contractor compliance—for instance, the multiple-entry visa
requirement for contractor employees would remain, but the visas would
be renewed through a US government contracting officer.
Additionally, weapons permits would once again be handled
through the commander of US Forces-Afghanistan or the US Embassy,
who would provide a current list of permits to the Afghans for accountability. In the unlikely event of a crime against an Afghan national,
the United States would have detention authority with an established
diplomatic process for handling requests to transfer US citizens to
Afghan jurisdiction. Although other conditions-based details would
be required, any limited immunity option would provide the Afghan
government with ultimate authority over contractors while providing
administrative mechanisms consistent with protections of other US
citizens accompanying military forces.

Conclusion

Even if one insists on viewing contractors as “mercenaries” such
actors have had a very long history, “much longer, in fact, than the
almost-exclusive deployment of national militaries to wage wars.”45
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have “triggered an explosion
of contracting, measured both in amounts of money and numbers of
personnel.”46 But, the reduction of contractor protections increases risks
to contractors and adversely affects the US mission. The following three
actions will remedy this problem:
1. Separate the BSA Joint Commission meetings from the NATO
SOFA Implementation Commission meetings. This independence will
allow US personnel to address contractor issues relevant to the US
mission that are not a priority interest for NATO and are currently
neglected in the Joint Commission. Additionally, recognition should be
given to the duty of US government personnel to protect and invest in
the welfare of US-citizen contractors.
2. American contractors and their US employees should be granted
greater immunity, especially when supporting dangerous activities. If
full immunity is not possible, then a system of limited immunity should
be negotiated as part of an amended BSA. In the meantime, the United
States should consider creating an official government position in theater
with the primary duties of assisting contractors with BSA compliance.
3. As the United States moves away from long-term contingency
operations and towards more frequent midterm expeditionary
operations, it is important to consider similar protections for contractors
in all combat theaters.
The United States military incorporates extensive contractor
support into both its routine and special operations at home and abroad.
45 Kathy Gilsinan, “The Return of the Mercenary: How Private Armies, and the Technology
They Use, Are Changing Warfare,” Atlantic, March 25, 2015.
46 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (2013):
650, doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1139485.
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At present, at least one commander has had to “substitute contractors
for soldiers” to “meet force manning levels” in Afghanistan.47 Ensuring
US contractors have the necessary administrative support and legal
protections ultimately benefits our nation and contributes to achieving
our strategic goals.

47 Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, Before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 115th Cong. (February 9, 2017) (statement of General John Nicholson, commander Resolute
Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).

